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Towards more resilience for a social 
EU – the constitutionally condi-
tioned Internal Market  
Dagmar Schiek
  
 
Abstract: Gap between the EU’s normative commitments to socio-economic justice and 
the practical workings of its integration project -- Potential for strengthening the Social 
EU by recourse to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) – 
CFREU normatively commits EU to a constitutionally conditioned Internal Market – 
CFREU curbs property rights and entrepreneurial freedom specifically for the sake of 
social rights guarantees – constructive response to legitimacy dilemmas emerging from 
cases such as Laval, Viking and AGET Iraklis – reinstating socially embedded constitu-
tionalism at EU levels as an alternative to relegating social integration to national levels. 
Introduction 
EU-induced policies in response to the post 2008 global crisis, entailing welfare state 
entrenchment, flexibilisation of employment relations and de-centralisation of industri-
al relations have invigorated critique of the demise of “social Europe”.
1
 This demise is 
also viewed as one of the causes of the Union’s potential disintegration.
2
 Indeed, in the 
last few years the European Union has failed to improve working and living conditions 
for the majority of its population,
3
 in spite of a slow upward trend.
 4
 
                                                          

Professor of Law, Queen’s University Belfast (d.schiek@qub.ac.uk). This paper profited from 
reflections with other contributors to D. Schiek et al., EU Social and Labour Rights and EU 
Internal Market Law (Brussels: European Parliament, 2015), specifically Chris Forde, Liz Oliver, 
Michael Doherty, Kerstin Ahlberg, Consuelo Chacartegui Javega, discussion at the ETUI’s 2016 
NETLEX conference, feedback by Dora Kostakopoulou (on presenting the full concept at the 2016 
CES in Philadelphia) and by Gordon Anthony, as well as the referees and editors. The usual dis-
claimer applies. 
1
 I Begg et al., 'EMU and Sustainable Integration', 37 Journal of European Integration (2015), p. 
803; H.-J. Bieling, 'Shattered Expectations: The Defeat of European Ambitons of Global Financial 
Reform', 8 Journal of European Public Policy (2014), p. 34; S. Garben, ‘The Constitutional 
(Im)balance between ‘the Market’ and ‘the Social’ in the European Union’ 13 EuConst (2017), p. 
23; A. Hinarejos, 'Changes to Economic and Monetary Union and their Effect on Social Policy', 32 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations (2016), p. 231, U. 
Neergaard, 'When Poverty comes in at the Door, Love Flies out the Window'. The Influence of 
Eurozone Reforms upon the Social Dimension of the EU - and Vice Versa?', 7 European Labour 
Law Journal, (2016), 168-204. 
2
 See, for example, S. Deakin, 'Brexit, Labour Rights and Migration: Why Wisbech Matters to 
Brussels', 17 German Law Journal (2016), 13-20. 
3
 EUROFUND, Experiencing the economic crisis in the EU: changes in living standards, deprivation 
and trust (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2015).  
4
 D. Schraad-Tischler and Ch. Schiller, Social Justice in the EU - Index Report (Düsseldorf: 
Bertelsmann Foundation, 2016). 
2 
This contradicts the European Union’s (EU) normative aspirations. These hark back to its 
origins as European Economic Community (EEC, 1957), which pursued the Common 
Market in order to promote an “accelerated raising of the standard of living”,
5
 relying 
on the intensification of social interaction as a base for enhanced economic and ulti-
mately human cooperation.
6
 Today’s EU continues to pursue these aims alongside an 
expanded catalogue of objectives: established for the sake of ‘elimination of barriers 
that divide Europe’ (Preamble TEU) and the ‘promotion of peace (...) and the well-being 
of (...) peoples’ (Article 3 (1) TEU), it aims at an ever closer union of peoples, not of 
states, underlining that the Union serves societies, not polities. Its goals combine free-
dom and solidarity with ecological and socio-economic sustainability (Article 3 TEU). 
While committed to establishing an internal market (Article 26 TFEU), the Treaty envis-
ages the social market economy (Article 3 (3) TEU) among others as an instrument for 
continuing improvement of living standards EU.
7
 If integration of markets is legitimised 
by the overarching aim of promoting economic and social progress (Article 3 (1) TEU), 
the EU’s practical failure at improving working and living standards for its citizens epit-
omises a normative crisis with constitutional dimensions.  
This article is part of a larger legal-constitutional academic project developing ways to 
close the gap between the EU’s normative commitments to socio-economic justice and 
the practical workings of its integration project. If the EU is to regain social legitimacy 
while continuing economic integration, it must pursue economic and social integration 
at European and national levels as an interconnected endeavour. Accordingly, law and 
politics of social integration (“social Europe”) will have to attain a veritable EU dimen-
sion. To realise this aim, EU level legislation, non-legislative governance and adjudica-
tion will have to change, and those changes will have to address shortcomings in the 
Internal Market
8
 as well as in the Economic and Monetary Union.
9
  
                                                          
5
 Article 2 EEC read: “The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market 
and progressively approximating the economic policies of member states, to promote through-
out the community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and bal-
anced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and 
closer relations between the states belonging to it". 
6
 See also D. Chalmers and S. Trotter, 'Fundamental Rights and Legal Wrongs: The Two Sides of 
the Same EU Coin', 22 European Law Journal (2016), 9-39, with a more pessimistic assessment. 
7
 For a more expansive explanation see D. Schiek, 'Re-embedding economic and social 
constitutionalism: normative perspectives for the EU', in D. Schiek et al (eds) European Economic 
and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 17. 
8
 Despite the recent dominance of the reflections of the global economic crisis in the €-zone 
economy, the Internal Market’s legal frame remains decisive for national and EU level realisation 
of “social Europe” (see on this Schiek et al fn *, see also Deakin fn 2), and continues to demand 
academic attention (for a recent overview from political science perspectives see M. Blauberger 
and S.K. Schmitt, ‘The European Court of Justice and its political impact’ 40 West European Poli-
tics (2017), p. 907). 
9
 See on recent critique of the negative impact of EMU governance on social integration in the 
EU Begg, Hinarejos and Neergaard (as cited in fn 1); on the related critique of de-legalisation in 
the framework of the crisis M. Everson and Ch. Joerges, 'Reconfiguring the Politics-Law Relation-
ship in the Integration Project through Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism', 18 European Law Jour-
nal, (2012), p. 644; N. Scicluna, European Union Constitutionalism in Crisis (New York: Routledge, 
2014); C. Kilpatrick, 'On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic 
Legal Values in Europe's Bailouts', 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2015), p. 325. 
3 
This article focuses on the changes required in the Court’s case law, if the EU is to 
achieve an EU level dimension of “social Europe” as an intrinsic element of its Internal 
Market. It argues that after the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU), the EU In-
ternal Market is constitutionally conditioned by social rights as well as by the economic 
rights guaranteed in the Charter. Instead of conceptualising the relation between those 
two types of rights as one of contradiction, the constitutionally conditioned Internal 
Market promotes economic integration, defined as the merging of markets at a trans-
national level, while respecting and promoting the entire range of CFREU rights, thus 
also promoting social integration, which enables citizens to govern their own lives by 
ensuring sufficient means for surviving and partaking in their polity’s cultural and social 
achievements.
 10 This approach challenges two alternatives propositions: that the EU is 
predominantly determined by an economic constitution,
11
 and that the EU constitution 
is wholly neutral towards different models of economic and social integration.
12
 While 
the argument moves deliberately within the framework of the existing Treaties,
13
 this is 
not intended to cast doubt on the value of Treaty reform. 
The article first presents the conventional perception of the Internal Market’s challeng-
es for “social Europe” as a three-pronged conceptual matrix of conflicts and tensions. 
Subsequently, the concept of constitutionally conditioning as an alternative to juxtapos-
ing EU economic integration and social policy is developed, with a focus on rights guar-
antees contained in the CFREU. In an ultimate step, the practical potential of the con-
cept is demonstrated by devising an alternative path for judicial decisions taken in the 
Court’s so-called Laval quartet and the recent AGET Iraklis case.  
The EU Internal Market Challenges and social rights 
A conceptual matrix 
The critique of the EU Internal Market’s impact on social policy seems deceptively sim-
ple at first sight: constitutionalisation of economic freedoms and competition law initi-
ates a vicious circle: litigation by individual parties or the EU Commission
14
 may result in 
judicial findings of inapplicability of social policy measures at national level on grounds 
of an infringement of EU economic freedoms or competition law. Replacing any such 
social policy measures at EU levels is encumbered by the complexity of achieving politi-
cal agreement in a Union of nearly 30 Member States, resulting in a structural imbal-
                                                          
10
 See D. Schiek, Economic and Social Integration. The Challenge for EU Constitutional Law (Ed-
ward Elgar, 2012), p. 13-49 
11
 E.g. K. Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
p.146-330. 
12
 E.g. C. Kaupa, The Pluralist Character of the European economic constitution (Hart 2016). 
13
 This is shared by H. Brunkhorst, 'Auswege aus der technokratischen Falle? Die unbeachtete 
Wirtschaftsverfassung Europas', 42 Leviathan, (2014), p. 508; see also (with a focus on 
legislation) C Barnard and G de Baere, Towards a European Social Union (Euroforum, 2014). 
14
 References and EU Commission infringement actions are the two most frequent procedures 
before the Court of Justice, comprising 458 references and 59 direct actions in 2016 (see Court 
of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report 2016, Luxembourg 2017, pp. 87-101). 
4 
ance in favour of economic integration
15
 and the incapacity of the EU to become a social 
market economy.
16
  
Upon closer inspection, the constitutionalisation of transnational economic integration 
through direct effect and supremacy of economic freedoms and competition law re-
quires a complex analysis in three dimensions. First, market constitutionalisation can be 
presented as conflicts between national and EU competences for regulation and/or 
adjudication. Secondly, adjudication of (social) policy is perceived as a potentially illegit-
imate limitation of the democratic legislative process. Thirdly, there is a potential ten-
sion in substance between the Internal Market and social policy. All three dimensions 
influence each other as visualised in the conceptual matrix portrayed below, and fur-
ther discussed in the remainder of this section. 
 
EU level versus national competences: the demise and resurrection of em-
bedded liberalism 
There is little doubt that direct effect and supremacy of the legal guarantees of eco-
nomic freedoms and competition law effectively constitutionalised the Internal Market 
at EU level.
 17 Decisions on whether and in how far to implement the four freedoms 
have been moved from the national to the supranational level. Nevertheless, the 
founders of the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957) did not perceive of the 
economic integration as isolated from national law and policy. Economic liberalisation 
at Community level was coupled with national autonomy in the field of social policy. To 
achieve its overall aims, the EEC depended on sufficient degrees of social integration at 
national levels, while not offering any legal guarantee to this effect.  
                                                          
15
 S. Garben, supra fn. 1, at p. 51, concurring with Scharpf and Joerges. 
16
 F. W Scharpf 'The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU cannot be a “social 
market economy”’', 8 Socio-Economic Review (2010), p. 211; challenged by D. Damjanovic, ('The 
EU market rules as social market rules: Why the EU can be a social market economy' 50 Common 
Market Law Review (2013), p. 1685).  
17
 M. Poiares Maduro, We The Court. The European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution (Oxford & Portland: Hart, 1998); A. Hatje, 'The Economic Constitution within the 
Internal Market', in A Bogdandy and J Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Beck 
& Hart, 2010), p. 589.  
 
Challenges of 
a constitutio-
nalised 
market 
EU level 
versus 
national 
competences 
Adjudication 
versus 
legislation substance: 
economic 
versus social?  
5 
This model was congruent with “embedded liberalism”, as empirically observed and 
normatively envisioned by John Ruggie:18 liberalisation of markets beyond national bor-
ders should be contained by national “intervention”19 aiming, among others, at “social 
protection”.20 Ruggie’s original model presupposed state cooperation with the aim of 
maintaining the potential for intervention while enabling global trade through agreeing 
on legal instruments. Changes in international economic law and politics initiated the 
demise of embedded liberalism as a global model.21 Accordingly, Abdelal and Ruggie 
now demand that international organisations should not promote capital liberalisation, 
but continue to burden national governments with the responsibility of ensuring the 
social legitimacy of global capitalism.22 
Constitutionalisation of the EU level rules on the Internal Market challenged embedded 
liberalism EU style:23 once the Court had established a broad notion of the economic 
freedoms, according to which free movement of goods, freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services could be restricted by any rule (or practice) making eco-
nomic activities across a border less economically attractive, swathes of national law 
and policy potentially qualified as restrictions. The economic freedoms could be read as 
providing scope for Member States to fulfil the national part of the embedded liberal-
ism compromise.24 However, the Court of Justice required that national law and policy 
are justified, while the deregulatory thrust of the economic freedoms had to be accept-
ed without any justification.  As far as embedded liberalism was practiced within the 
EU, it lost its equilibrium through this case law.  
Parts of the literature decry the demise of embedded liberalism, and devise ways how 
to re-establish its regime. For example, Mulder
25
 promotes responsive adjudication, 
which should safeguard national social policy against overly intrusive ECJ case law pro-
moting economic integration. This is based on the conceptual doubt of whether links 
between citizens beyond national borders are sufficiently close to legitimise redistribu-
                                                          
18
 See J.G. Ruggie ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order’ 36 International Organisation (1982), p. 379. 
19
 Ruggie (1982) p. 4, 9. 
20
 Ibidem p. 11. 
21
 These comprise the break-down of the Bretton Woods compromise through abandoning a 
global regime of currency coordination regulation of currency relations (see for a brief summary 
with further references Schiek, supra note 10, p. 16-17), on the contribution of EU level econom-
ic integration to dismantling the preconditions of the practical emanation of embedded liberal-
ism by the EEC see Ch. Hermann, 'Crisis, structural reform and the dismantling of the European 
Social Model', 35 Economic and Industrial Democracy (2014), p. 51. 
22
 R. Abdelal and J.G. Ruggie ‘The Principles of Embedded Liberalism: Social Legitimacy and Glob-
al Capitalism’ in D. Moss and J Cisernino (eds) New Perspectives on Regulation (The Tobin Project 
2009), p.151, at p. 157, 159. 
23
 See St. Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution. A Labour 
Law Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
24
 See D Schiek, 'The European Social Model and the Services Directive', in U. Neergaard, R Niel-
sen and L Roseberry (eds) The Services Directive - Consequences for the Welfare State and the 
European Social Model (DJØF Publishing, 2008), p. 25. 
25
 See J. Mulder, 'Responsive Adjudication and the 'Social Legitimacy' of the Internal Market', 22 
European Law Journal, (2016), p. 597. 
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tion.
26
 Inevitably Member States and the EU itself share responsibility for the overall 
social legitimacy of the European Union as a composite polity. Thus, the social com-
promises found at national levels deserve protection until such time that a European 
level compromise has been established.
27
 However, relocating the responsibility for 
social policy to Member States alone would also mean to reinforce the decoupling of 
economic integration at EU level from social integration at national levels. That same 
decoupling has been identified as a risk for maintaining the European Social Model early 
in the 2000s.
28
 Thus, it is highly unlikely that re-instating embedded liberalism, as it was 
observed in the 1980s, in a more elaborate form is suitable for re-establishing the EU’s 
social legitimacy in the 21st century.  
The Achilles’ Heel of the remaining defenders of the constitutionalised Internal Market 
in the absence of EU level constitutional guarantees of social rights is the declining ca-
pacity of nation states to provide the complementary social policy needed to maintain 
the social legitimacy of economic integration. It has been argued that the constitution-
alised Internal Market itself, and even more so Economic and Monetary Union, endan-
ger this very capacity.
29
 The social embedding of EU economic integration cannot be 
provided by nation states alone. This consideration gains relevance ever more with the 
increasing divergence of economies and societies in EU Member States which again is 
enhanced by EU enlargements and the operation of Economic and Monetary Union. 
States governing a weaker economy, having lower tax (or other state) revenue and lim-
ited regulatory power would not be able to guarantee levels of social integration that 
would be sufficient to maintain the EU’s aim of constituting a transnational economy in 
socially responsible ways.
30
 Also, European economic integration going beyond mere 
state cooperation, as envisaged by traditional international law, is now in operation for 
more than 60 years. This has engendered truly transnational economic structures, in 
which national borders become increasingly irrelevant for business activity. This again 
means that business is beyond the reach of national social law and policy because the 
Internal Market increases the ease with which it moves from one regulatory regime to 
another. As a consequence, if the social embedding of the EU Internal Market is to suc-
ceed, it needs to be established at the EU level, where this market is constitutionalised. 
Adjudication versus legislation – a limited perspective  
The critique of the EU’s imbalanced integration between economic and social realms 
also constitutes a critique of its Court and its legitimate role. A focus on the dispropor-
                                                          
26
 R. Bellamy and A. Waele, 'Political legitimacy and European monetary union: contracts, 
constitutionalism and the normative logic of two-level games', 22 Journal of European Public 
Policy, (2015), 257-74, similarly Garben, op. cit. fn. 1, p. 27, and Joerges, supra fn. 34. 
27
 D Schiek, supra fn. 24. 
28
 Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with Challenges of Diversity’ 40 Journal of Com-
mon Market Studies (2002), p. 645. 
29
 D. Ashiagbor, 'Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare Law in the 
Context of EU Market Integration' 19 European Law Journal (2013), p. 303; S Giubboni, 'Social 
Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution: A Reappraisal', in K. Tuori and S. 
Sankari (eds) The Many Constitutions of Europe, (Ashgate, 2010), p. 241, D. Schiek, supra n. 7, M. 
Höpner and A. Schäfer, 'A New Phase of European Integration: Organised Capitalism in Post-
Ricardian Europe', 33 West European Politics (2010), p. 344. 
30
 See for more detail D. Schiek (2012), supra fn. 10, p. 230-232. 
7 
tionate power of judges in adjudicating the Internal Market
31
 has led some authors to 
suggest that direct effect and supremacy of EU law should no longer be recognised
32
 or 
that there should be an EU level mechanism for Member States to challenge conten-
tious rulings by the Court of Justice.
33
 While some of these authors demand protecting 
the Member States’ authority (including for social policy) from the ECJ’s adjudication,
34
 
the prioritisation of legislation over adjudication is not necessarily linked to a prefer-
ence for national social policymaking. For example, Grimm promotes a mixed model, 
demanding that the economic freedoms and competition law are removed from the EU 
Treaties, to allow changes through the ordinary EU legislative process.
35
 This proposal 
aims at empowering democratic process at national as well as at EU levels, hoping that 
this will result in meaningful social integration measures. Vouching for EU level social 
policy beyond the judicial arena, Sacha Garben promotes changing the EU Treaties to 
reduce the economic freedoms to mere bans of discrimination, allowing for EU level 
legislation re-balancing “the market” and “the social”.
36
  
These positions question the current state of the EU as a constitutional democracy, 
where legislators at national and EU levels are bound by judicially enforceable rights, 
protected by a strong constitutional court and not open for amendment by simple par-
liamentary democracy. Constitutional democracy in European national constitutions 
was first motivated by the aim to avoid a repetition of the Holocaust’s atrocities, and 
later by the human-rights deficits behind the proverbial iron curtain.
37
 The classical justi-
fication of constitutional democracy developed by Ely for nation states
38
 rests on the 
need to safeguard the interests of minorities which will be at a structural disadvantage 
in a majoritarian democracy. 
This justification is enhanced through the increasing trans-nationalisation of economies 
and societies which the EU Internal Market aims to engender. The diversity of a polity 
such as the EU with nearly 30 Member States does not offer a dense web of social rela-
                                                          
31
 F. Scharpf, 'Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Pre-emption of Democracy', 9 Zeitschrift für 
Staats- und Europawissenschaften (2011), p. 163-98, M. Höpner and A. Schäfer, supra n. 29. 
32
 Ch. Joerges, 'Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy: A Plea for a Supranational Conflict of 
Laws, in', in B. Kohler-Koch and B. Rittberger (eds) Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the 
European Union, (Ranham : Rownan & Littlefield, 2007), p. 311, M. Dawson and F. de Witte, 
'From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU', 22 European Law Journal (2016), p. 
204. 
33
 F. Scharpf, 'Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity', 1 European Political Science Review, 
(2009), p. 173. 
34
 This is implicitly linked to the assumption that EU citizens would not develop sufficient levels 
of transnational solidarity to construe an EU level social model (Ch. Joerges ‘Integration through 
law and the crisis of law in Europe’s emergency’ in D. Chalmers et al (eds) The End of the Euro-
crat’s Dream (Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 416, at p. 440). 
35
 D. Grimm, Europa ja - aber welches? (Beck, 2016), chapters I, II and IV, for a critical assessment 
see NN (Editorial Comments) ‘A way to win back support for the European project?’ 54 CMLR 
(2017), p. 1. 
36
 S. Garben, supra fn. 1. 
37
 A Stone Sweet, 'The European Court of Justice', in P. Craig and G de Búrca (eds) The Evolution 
of EU Law ( Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 121. 
38
 J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust. A Constitutional Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University 
Press, 1980). 
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tions that could mitigate the exclusionary tendencies of majoritarian democracies, add-
ing a further argument in favour of juridification. Jo Weiler was one of the first to sub-
mit that national legislators and constitutional adjudication may well neglect the inter-
ests of non-national EU citizens necessitating specific protection by the European Court 
of Justice.39 Judicial control as a complementary way of governance retains a significant 
role in protecting citizens against national bias as well as majoritarian bias at EU level.  
In the EU, whose constitutionalised Internal Market enables transnational market ex-
change defying national legislation, citizens also need protection against regulatory 
power by economic actors. While a treatise of the multiple emanations of rulemaking 
by commercial and non-commercial non-state actors are beyond the scope of this arti-
cle,40 it is worthwhile underlining the potential offered by judicial rights protection to 
challenge rules made by non-state actors. The ECJ’s doctrine of horizontal effects of 
economic freedoms  entails this  potential, and can thus enhance the constitutional 
legitimacy of the Internal Market.  
Recognising a strong role for a constitutional court also necessitates recognising its po-
litical role. Adjudication, especially constitutional adjudication, of necessity goes beyond 
deriving the one possible answer to a legal question from the positive law,
41
 even 
though it rests on legal hermeneutics instead of parliamentary discourse. This is reflect-
ed in the practice of many courts – continental and otherwise – to allow for minority 
opinions. Judicial discourse can change, is open to constant challenge, and change 
should not be viewed as a weakness. On the contrary, the deliberative character of 
constitutional adjudication
42
 is a precondition for its legitimacy as one element of dem-
                                                          
39
 J. Weiler, ‘In defence of the status quo: Europe’s constitutional Sonderweg’, in J. Weiler and 
M. Wind (eds) European Constitutionalism beyond the State (Cambridge University Press 2003), 
p. 7. This is now referred to as the “Argument from Transnational Effects” (A. Somek, 'The 
Argument from Transnational Effects I: Representing Outsiders through Freedom of Movement', 
16 European Law Journal (2010), p. 315; J. Mulder, supra fn. 25, at 600-620, and harks back to 
classical expositions of the Court’s development of EU Internal Market Law (e.g. M Poaires 
Maduro, We the Court (Hart Publishing, 1998). 
40
 See for a summary of my deliberations on this so far D. Schiek, 'A constitution of social 
governance for the European Union', in N. Ferreira and D. Kostakopoulou (eds) The Human Face 
of the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 17, 
41
 This is a consequence of the principled indeterminacy of any law. Notwithstanding profound 
differences in detail, there is agreement in so far between linguists, positivists and different 
jurisprudential schools. Linguists agree on the existence of imbued meaning and the necessity of 
drawing on circumstantial knowledge when understanding textual language, which is also the 
starting point of critical discourse analysis (Th. van Leeuwen, 'Discourse as Recontextualisation 
of Social Practice: A Guide', in R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds) Methods of Critical Discourse 
Analysis, (Sage, 2009), p. 144, at 147). Positivist legal theorists acknowledge the open texture of 
law as described above ) H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, with a postscript by Penelope Bulloch 
and Joseph Raz (Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 ed 1997), p. 118, 123-126), including “uncertainty” 
(Hart) or judicial discretion and choice (D. Leczykiewicz, 'Why Do the European Court of Justice 
Judges Need Legal Concepts?', 14 European Law Journal (2008), p. 773, at 774); from the 
perspective of a former constitutional court judge see Grimm, supra fn 35, at p. 8. 
42
 On models for judicial deliberation see O. Gerstenberg ‘Negative/positive constitutionalism, 
“fair balance,” and the problem of justiciability’ (10) Int J Const Law (2012), p. 904; see also B. de 
Witte, ‘Democratic Adjudication in Europe – How Can the European Court of Justice be Respon-
sive to the Citizen?’ in M. Dougan, N Nic Shuibhne and E Spaventa (eds) Empowerment and Dis-
empowerment of the European Citizen (Hart Publishing, 2012). 
9 
ocratic governance in complex polities and societies, and indeed of the legitimacy of 
judicial governance in the EU polity.
43
 Therefore, any court cannot but be a political and 
social actor in deciding which aspects of an indeterminate norm it allows to prevail.44 
Accordingly, the Court’s case law will need to be challenged politically as well as aca-
demically. The conditions for the case law to change include an attentive public sphere 
which takes note of the Court’s direction and subjects it to the scrutiny of public dis-
course, thus enabling the Court to become responsive to the citizenry. This discourse 
must respect the judicial function, which is to interpret the positive law, and bring it 
into line with the requirements of justice. Academic legal discourse is an important 
element of this scrutiny. It is in this spirit that an alternative path for the Court to follow 
is developed sub III and IV.  
Substance: economic versus social?  
The substantive prong of the critique sketched above
45
 focusses on the bias of the EU 
integration project towards a specific economic model, with structural bias against sus-
taining social values at EU, transnational or national levels. This critique focusses on the 
ECJ’s jurisprudence on economic freedoms and competition law, the provisions forming 
the core of the EU’s economic constitution.  
Briefly summarised,
46
 the critique asserts that the Court of Justice, by reading the eco-
nomic freedoms as bans on restricting transnational economic activity as well as trans-
national trade, classifies any measure rendering the exercise of one of the economic 
freedoms in another Member State less attractive than the exercise of the same free-
dom at a mere national level as a restriction of an economic freedom. A restriction does 
not necessarily constitute an infringement, as it can be justified. While defining the 
substantive reach of economic freedoms ever more widely, the Court has also expand-
ed the options to justify a restriction beyond those positively enshrined in the Treaty. 
Any mandatory requirement in the public interest can justify a restriction, as long as the 
restriction is proportionate to achieve this aim. The jurisprudence on the economic 
freedoms has wavered between merely enforcing economic freedoms across borders 
and promoting economic liberty independently of its trans-border character. Recent 
case law has shown a tendency to become more lenient on the requirement of transna-
tionality, for example in assuming a limitation of cross-border trade in goods if the use 
of a good is restricted, for example through a ban of using watercrafts on non-
commercial waterways or towing trailers behind motorcycles.
47
 If the Court defends not 
only cross-border economic activity, but the use of market freedoms more widely, it 
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may be accused of lending constitutional authority to one particular approach to eco-
nomic policy, often portrayed as the basis of ordo-liberal thought.
48
 A wide scope of 
application for economic freedoms bases the EU economic constitution on economic 
liberties for entrepreneurs. This narrow perspective is arguably contested within the 
Treaties, which provide for planned production and price regimes in the agricultural 
policy, protect EU internal production through a common customs tariff and promote 
substantive investment through the common transport policy as well as industrial poli-
cies.
49
  
In the field of EU competition law, the Court shares authority with the EU Commission 
as EU competition authority. The Commission’s official role here comprises issuing 
guidelines, and enforcing competition rules such as the prohibition of cartels, of the 
abuse of a dominant market position or of state aid. The Court and the national courts 
can be seized not only to challenge the actions of national and EU competition authori-
ties, but also in order to invalidate legislation and challenge behaviour of non-state 
actors deemed, by ECJ standards, to be economic actors. Again, the competition rules 
can be interpreted as mainly aimed at protecting the Internal Market from practices of 
private economic actors; or more principled as ordaining competitive markets as a prin-
ciple of organising societies. The Court and the EU Commission have charted a contra-
dictory course in both regards, and this course still awaits a thorough theorisation from 
critical perspectives on economic and social integration.
50
 Accordingly, the principles of 
the constitutionally conditioned Internal Market will be developed in relation to eco-
nomic freedoms below, leaving a thorough discussion of EU competition law for a dif-
ferent occasion.   
The Court’s prevailing interpretation of economic freedoms veers towards an economic 
constitution prioritising the individual rights of economic actors. By placing justifications 
in the public interest systematically on the proverbial back foot, it also is intrusive on 
social integration measures. While the process may lead to accepting national social 
policy choices, more frequently these are invalidated or stymied.
51
 Case law on econom-
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ic freedoms is not limited to controlling legislation. Instead, direct horizontal effect of 
economic freedoms also allows judicial review of market actors’ rules.  
Considering the current case law from a legal-realist perspective, Tuori stresses that EU 
Internal Market law constitutes a strong economic constitution, which is co-original 
with the European integration project.
52
 This seems to render other constitutional lay-
ers of the EU edifice, including the social constitution, less powerful. Kilpatrick and de 
Witte even portray the economic and the social constitution as mutually exclusive, sug-
gesting that one will be victorious over the other eventually.
53 
 For some authors, the 
layered presentation of the EU’s constitution constitutes the starting point for a critique 
of EU law and policies, predicting doom for the European integration project because it 
fails to achieve its promises of improving Europe’s societies.
54
 These strands of substan-
tive critique, in all their diversity, juxtapose the Internal Market as part of the EU’s eco-
nomic constitution to the demands of other constitutional principles at EU level.  
This juxtaposition risks overlooking contradictions and opportunities to drive forward 
an interpretation of internal market law that would support the social embedding of EU 
constitutional law not only through national legislation, but at the EU level itself.  
5. Beyond the impasse 
In order to overcome the EU’s normative impasse as sketched initially it is necessary to 
move beyond juxtaposing the EU’s economic constitution on the one hand and its social 
values on the other. This substantive starting point will invite confusing the protection 
of Member States sovereignty with the pursuit of social policy within the European 
Union. This again neglects the potential for protecting and promoting social rights at EU 
level, which again is a precondition of overcoming the stated imbalance between the 
EU’s economic and social constitution. 
The Treaties and their predecessors themselves have never merely juxtaposed pure 
economic integration with other forms of integration. Instead, they combine free 
movement of goods and services, as well as competition rules with guarantees of free 
movement of persons and capital. By guaranteeing free movement of persons, especial-
ly of workers, under the condition of equal treatment alongside economic freedoms for 
producers and service providers, the European Union’s unique socio-economic model of 
regional integration holds out the promise of participative inclusion. 
Accordingly, the much criticised ECJ case law also is inconsistent. For example, horizon-
tal effect of economic freedoms has contradictory effects: it may protect weaker parties 
such as free-moving workers from discrimination by employers, but may also be utilised 
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by those in a position of economic power, such as the members of the Swedish building 
sector employers’ association, against the claims of workers posted to Sweden.
55
 
The ambiguous character of EU constitutional law does not merely suggest that the EU 
constitution refrains from determining a certain model of economic integration.
56
 Going 
beyond this, it is necessary and possible to derive a normative frame supporting rather 
than obstructing the social embedding of market constitutionalisation at EU level.
 57
 The 
concept of constitutionally conditioning the Internal Market ensures that constitutional-
isation through rights guarantees can provide a basis for strengthening “social Europe”. 
When the ECJ’s case law eventually changes to embrace this concept, this will also facil-
itate legislative projects such as implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights.58 
Constitutionally conditioned Internal Market: enhancing social rights 
effectively 
In developing the Constitutionally conditioned Internal Market, this section first intro-
duces the concept, and subsequently argues that a purposive interpretation of the 
CFREU points to constitutional conditioning as its normative demand.  
Constitutional conditioning – the concept 
The notion of a constitutionally conditioned market is inspired by the Polanyian idea 
that markets, if based on unlimited liberties, risk endangering society and thus their 
own basis.
 59 Polanyi predicted that societies would eventually produce counter-
movements to contain the destructive tendencies of pure egotism,
60
 describing this 
process by the term “embedding”, whose often criticised imprecision
61
 invited re-
interpretation. Ruggie’s embedded liberalism
62
 constituted such a re-interpretation, in 
that it proposed embedding global economic integration through national institutions. 
The implicit decoupling of trade liberalisation (at international levels) from social inte-
gration (at national levels) constitutes this model’s central weakness. 
Sharing the principle that trade is conditional upon respecting social constitutions, the 
concept of “constitutional conditioning” proposes to overcome this weakness by de-
manding a re-embedding of the EU Internal Market through legal guarantees at EU lev-
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els. For a society to survive, competitiveness is not sufficient. Competitiveness does 
nothing to engender cooperation, which is the vital basis for societies. Nevertheless, 
markets are not only social constructs, but also constitute spheres of interaction be-
tween people. Such market cooperation harbours the potential to further social cohe-
sion, as has been recognised by the EEC’s founding idea of utilising market-based coop-
eration to gradually bring the people of Europe closer together. Hearkening back to 
European classics of political sociology, the dichotomy between Weberian and Durk-
heimian (Parsonian) approaches
63
 allows theorising the conditions of social cohesion 
through market integration in the EU: the former demands a certain degree of homo-
geneity for societies to integrate, while the latter relies on solidarity derived from per-
forming distinct roles in diverse societies. Only the latter version allows a positive vision 
of “unity in diversity”, which is the EU’s motto.  
However, solidarity based on a market-based division of labour is not an automatic 
process. It requires a civilising frame,
64
 embedding economically motivated interaction 
and thus facilitating social integration. Such a frame can be engendered through rules 
and ultimately law.
65
 Comprehensive notions of human rights are well suited to function 
as a civilising frame for markets. They safeguard the ability of citizens to self-govern 
their lives, which of course pre-supposes cooperation with and respecting the rights of 
others. This means that human rights should offer protection against overbearing regu-
lation by states or the European Union as well as by overbearing private actors. 66 Read 
in this way, human rights become preconditions for markets, constituting them, and 
their protection cannot be interpreted as a limitation or restriction of markets.
 
 
The EU integration project, based on the progressive expansion of economic integration 
as an instrument to achieve an ever closer union of peoples, can only remain politically 
sustainable if its Internal Market is embedded in such a civilising frame. The next sec-
tion argues that the EU, by accepting the binding legal character of the CFREU, has also 
accepted that the Internal Market is constitutionally conditioned, particularly by social 
rights.67 
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The CFREU: a specifically “social” constitutional condition of the Internal 
Market 
By giving the Charter has the same status as the Treaties (Article 6 TEU), the Member 
States have endowed the European Union with a meta-layer of rights enjoying priority 
over other law.
 68 This emerges from the priority of human dignity as the “real basis of 
fundamental rights” (Explanatory text to Article 1 CFREU), which does not lend itself to 
accepting the constitutional protection of markets as such, or economic actors who are 
not human beings. Under Article 1 CFREU, human dignity “is inviolable (and) must be 
respected and protected.” According to Article 51, the Union and its Member States 
(when implementing Union law) “shall (...) respect the rights, observe the principles and 
promote the application thereof”. Taken together, these provisions reflect a compre-
hensive human rights doctrine, as in particular endorsed by the ECtHR, according to 
which public authorities must respect, protect and promote human rights.69 The CFREU 
thus moves beyond a merely defensive towards a comprehensive conception of human 
rights.  
The CFREU also constitutes a new era of rights constitutionalism in that it views the 
values of dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity as indivisible,
70
 instead of repeating 
the traditional compartmentalisations of guarantees into civil, political and socio-
economic rights.
71
 For example, social and labour rights are not quarantined into one 
chapter only containing principles. They are scattered across the Charter: Article 5 ban-
ning slavery and Article 12 guaranteeing the right to join a trade union alongside Article 
15 guaranteeing the right to engage in work, can be found under the heading “free-
doms”, while under the heading “solidarity”, rights to information and consultation at 
the place of work (Article 27), to collective bargaining (Article 28), and to fair working 
conditions respecting health, safety and dignity, as well as providing for annual leave 
and limits to the daily working time (Article 31) accompany a straight forward prohibi-
tion of child labour (Article 32), and the demand of respect for entitlements to social 
security benefits and social and housing assistance (Article 34). The CFREU also guaran-
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tees rights for business: for example, Article 15 guarantees the free movement of em-
ployees72 as well as entrepreneurs,73 though this guarantee is limited to natural per-
sons, and does not encompass corporate actors. Their interests are protected by the 
Treaties’ economic freedoms, as well as by Articles 16 and17 CFREU74. The right to a 
private life (Article 7) can be relied upon to ward off overzealous scrutiny of business by 
competition authorities,75 while freedom to express an opinion can be relied upon for 
defending labelling and other marketing strategies.76 While Article 21 (1) protects 
against discrimination on grounds such as sex, racial and ethnic origin and disability also 
in working life,77 the second paragraph of this provision protects economic actors as 
well as employees against discrimination on grounds of nationality.  
This de-compartmentalisation of rights refutes the alleged hierarchy between the EU 
economic constitution and its social constitution (epitomised by the objective to ap-
proximate working and living conditions while their improvement is being maintained) 
in favour of the former. In guaranteeing protections of potentially conflicting interests 
alongside each other, the CFREU confirms that competing interests can and must be 
reconciled.  
Significantly, the CFREU establishes a subtle hierarchy between rights through differen-
tiation in the textual guarantees. Some rights are guaranteed with an inherent re-
striction, for example indicated by the phrase that they are guaranteed “in accordance 
with Union law and national law and practices”, or “may be regulated by law in so far as 
is necessary for the general interest”. For justifying a limitation of rights with such an 
inherent limitation, EU or national legislators can rely on any general interest, and do 
not have to identify a specific Charter right which demands the limitation. By contrast, if 
a right is guaranteed without an inherent limitation, justifications of restrictions must 
comply with a higher standard. These differences indicate a structured interrelation of 
CFREU rights: rights with inherent limitations must cede more ground to rights without 
those inherent limitations than vice versa. 
Even more radically, the subtle hierarchy thus established accords a slight priority to 
social rights. It guarantees all business-related rights (Articles 16 and 17), which under-
pin economic freedoms such as freedom of establishment and freedom to provide ser-
vices, merely in accordance with Union law and national law and practices, or subject to 
such limitations as are necessary for safeguarding the public interest. These inherent 
limitations of business rights confirm the Court’s case law from before the CFREU was 
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adopted.
78
 By contrast, some social rights are guaranteed without inherent limitations. 
This applies, for example, to the right to fair and just working conditions (Article 31) and 
freedom of association (Article 12), though rights to collective bargaining and action 
(Article 28) are merely guaranteed in accordance with Union law and national practice. 
The  more favourable position for some social and labour rights in comparison with 
rights underpinning economic rights mirrors the EU socio-economic model,79 which 
allocates a specifically enhanced position to social integration.  
Nevertheless, the CFREU at times guarantees social rights at the same level as economic 
rights. For example, both the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16) on the one 
hand and workers’ rights to information and consultation (Article 27) and entitlements 
to social security and social assistance (Article 34) on the other hand are guaranteed “in 
accordance with Union law and national law and practices”. Under Article 52 (1) CFREU 
potential clashes between equally ranked rights are to be resolved through mutual 
maximisation:
80
 CFREU rights can be limited – subject to the principle of subsidiarity - if 
this is necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Thus, countervailing 
rights should be realised to the degree that on balance neither is limited any more than 
necessary. Its effective implementation depends on the bi-directional application of the 
proportionality principle. For example, if workers’ rights to information and consulta-
tion are relied upon to limit freedom to conduct a business, the proportionality princi-
ple requires that the restriction of freedom to conduct a business does not go over and 
above what is necessary to achieve the aim pursued. This may result in limiting the 
scope for information and consultation of employee representatives. A bidirectional 
approach requires that the judge scrutinises any such limitations of workers’ rights by 
assessing whether they itgo over and above what is necessary to safeguard freedom to 
conduct a business.  
The Court’s case law, if favouring constitutional rights epitomised by economic free-
doms, does not always comply with these principles. Restrictions of economic freedoms 
must safeguard human rights as protected by EU law,
81
 but if Member States rely on 
human rights for justifying such restrictions, human rights protection is relegated to 
“the second (justification) stage of analysis”.
82
 The bi-directional application of the pro-
portionality principle would correct this imbalance. 
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What does constitutional conditioning achieve in principle? 
Predominantly, the concept of constitutional conditioning perceives of (social) rights 
guarantees as shaping economic integration. This contrasts with perspectives that per-
ceive of markets as spheres of original liberty, quasi-governed by forces of nature, pre-
empting any human rights guarantees. Such liberalist perspectives would utilise human 
rights guarantees for the defence of market processes against “intervention” by regula-
tion, litigation or policies promoting the general interest, including social policy. What 
appears as “intervention in markets” from those liberalist perspectives is transformed 
into the constitutional conditioning of markets under the approach proposed here. 
Markets must be structured and regulated
83
 for the sake of realising the constitutional 
condition in which they are meant to be.  
The Charter of Fundamental Rights supports constitutional conditioning in two ways: 
first, it establishes subtle hierarchies between rights, which weaken those guarantees 
that underpin economic freedoms, notably the freedom to conduct a business and the 
right to property. Some social rights are not so limited, which is an expression of consti-
tutional conditionality in favour of social rights. Secondly, the CFREU demands mutual 
optimisation of those rights guaranteed at equal level, which defies the priority which 
has been allocated to economic freedoms by the Court so far.  
The next section considers some practical applications, discussing in how far the consti-
tutional conditioning provides a template for the ECJ to revise its case law on economic 
freedoms.  
Practical consequences of constitutional conditioning  
This section revisits the Court’s much discussed Laval quartet,
 84
 and proceeds to analyse 
the AGET Iraklis ruling of December 2016.
 85
 It demonstrates how the constitutional 
conditioning parameter offers a set of new hermeneutic principles derived from the 
CFREU, by which the Court can decide cases where economic freedoms and social rights 
seem to clash in line with the EU Treaties’ commitment to social justice.  
Re-drafting Viking and Laval 
The roots of the widely debated86 set of cases known as the “Laval quartet” lie in the 
purported clash between effective collective bargaining and collective industrial action 
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and the EU economic freedoms; the perception that this conflict can only be resolved 
by limiting either collective bargaining rights (as social rights) or economic freedoms; 
and the “solution” offered by the Court affirming the priority of the latter.  
In the 1970s, the Court first established that collective agreements may constitute a 
restriction of today’s Article 56 TFEU.87 In 1997 the Court found that a Member State 
refusing to commit police forces to curb social protests against the Internal Market in 
goods infringed what is today Article 34 TFEU.
88
 From then on, it was easy to predict 
that the Court would target as an infringement of economic freedoms any collective 
industrial action that would make the cross-border provision of services or re-
establishment of a company less attractive.
89
 However, the rulings in Laval and Viking
90
 
further elaborated this past case law, and brought home the implications of applying 
the economic freedoms largely unfettered by effective protection of social rights in an 
Internal Market with vastly diverging wage levels.  
The Laval case has its origins in a claim lodged by Laval, a Latvian company and owner 
of the Swedish company Baltic Bydd,
91
 before Swedish courts. Laval challenged the le-
gality of a blockade and other modes of industrial action staged by BYGNADS, the Swe-
dish builders’ trade union with the aim of concluding a collective agreement between 
BYGNADS and the Swedish company which would guarantee that pay was governed by 
the same framework for all workers working side by side on the same building site. Bal-
tic Bydd used workers posted by its Latvian owners, and did not intend to pay these 
Latvian workers at levels usual in Sweden. There are some indications that the case was 
staged from Sweden to break the hold of BYGNADS on wages in the building sector.
92
 
The Viking case emerged from an employer’s claim against the Finish Seamen’s Union 
(FSU) and the International Transport Workers Federation (ITWF), raised before a Brit-
ish court because ITWF is registered in London. The employer had re-registered a vessel 
under the Estonian flag, with the aim of enhancing the profitability of a ferry between 
Tallin and Helsinki by lowering wages paid to seafarers. The FSU threatened collective 
action, and the ITWF issued a circulaire to its members asking them not to enter into 
negotiations with Viking Line ABP while the industrial dispute was ongoing. The combi-
nation of these activities had effectively hindered the employer from lowering wages 
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until Estonia joined the EU. At this point, the employer decided to litigate, relying on its 
EU economic freedoms to achieve the aim it failed to accomplish through negotiation.   
In both cases the Court held that the right to collective bargaining and collective indus-
trial action was guaranteed under EU law in principle, and that collective industrial ac-
tion aiming to improve working conditions could in principle justify the restriction of 
economic freedoms by efficient collective industrial action. However, collective indus-
trial action would only be proportionate to achieving that aim if it was absolutely neces-
sary for this purpose. For the Viking case, that judgment was left to the national court. 
However,  the ECJ held that boycotts and strikes would only be legal if necessary to 
protect the Finnish workers’ posts or working conditions, and that the employers’ legal-
ly non-binding commitment to refrain from dismissing the Finnish crew would render 
the action unnecessary. In the Laval case, the Court found the industrial action of a 
Swedish trade union aiming to force an employer posting Latvian workers to sign an 
association agreement with them to be unjustifiable. Much of the case turned on the 
interpretation of Directive 96/71
93
, which, however, was interpreted as mere specifica-
tion of Article 56 TFEU on freedom to provide services. That provision, the Court held, 
prevented the trade union from fighting for a higher level of protection than was guar-
anteed by EU legislation and required that the trade union disclose its red lines before 
any negotiation even started. There was no margin of appreciation for the trade unions 
in justifying their action, which would ensure that economic freedoms and fundamental 
constitutional rights were adequately balanced, resulting in critical assessment by in-
ternational human rights bodies.
94
  
Under the principles of a constitutionally conditioned internal market this line of case 
law is untenable. This derives from the specific hierarchy established by the Charter 
between collective labour rights and constitutional equivalents of economic freedoms. 
Collective labour rights such as the right of freedom of association (Article 12) and the 
right to collective bargaining and collective industrial action (Article 28) are inextricably 
linked, although guaranteed in discrete provisions of the Charter. This is particularly 
well established by the ECtHR case law on Article 11 ECHR, which clarifies that a guaran-
tee of freedom of association for trade unions includes constitutional protection of 
collective bargaining and collective industrial action.
95
 To maintain congruence of the 
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European Convention of Human Rights and the Charter as demanded by Article 52 (3) of 
the Charter, Article 12 must be read - in line with this ECtHR case law – as embodying 
rights to collective bargaining and collective industrial action.
96
 Article 12 thus forms the 
basis for collective labour rights, while Articles 27 and 28 provide specifications. Accord-
ingly, collective labour rights are guaranteed as rights that can be restricted only with 
reference to Article 52 of the Charter, i.e. by in order to protect the general interest as 
well as competing rights. The reference to national traditions in Article 28 retains its 
relevance in that the Union guarantees must account for the diversity of national tradi-
tions in industrial relations. Any limitation of the rights to collective bargaining and col-
lective industrial action under Article 52 must not deprive these rights of their essence. 
Further, the limitation must be proportionate to achieve its aim. Hence, the question 
must be asked whether curtailing collective bargaining and industrial action is unavoid-
able for enabling the exercise of the economic freedoms.  
The economic freedoms of corporations can be underpinned by Article 16 of the Char-
ter, and are thus only guaranteed in accordance with Union law and national law. Since 
the Charter is part of Union law, Article 16 rights are only guaranteed in line with Article 
12 rights. Accordingly, business in the EU must occasionally expect to be subjected to 
industrial action as well as to be bound by collective bargaining agreements. 
To comply with the Charter, the Court would have to assume that collective industrial 
action is nothing unusual. Accordingly, strikes or blockades would not automatically 
qualify as restrictions of economic freedoms. If a Swedish business operating in Sweden 
that is evading its obligations under collective labour agreements is subjected to collec-
tive industrial action, a Latvian business evading that same obligation would have to 
expect the same treatment. Thus, the strike action suffered by Laval un Partneri would 
not constitute any specific detriment to transnational business, and hence no restriction 
of freedom to provide services. Similarly, since trade unions oppose companies moving 
to escape the binding force of a collective agreement, collective industrial action under-
taken with that purpose is admissible in principle.
97
 The same activity directed against 
an employer that aims to establish itself in another EU Member State can hardly be 
viewed as restriction of freedom of establishment.  
Under specific circumstances, collective industrial action may still qualify as a restriction 
of economic freedoms. For example, if trade unions would engage in collective industri-
al action with the aim of preventing individual persons from exercising their free 
movement rights – whether as workers or service providers – this would clearly consti-
tute a restriction. Similarly, if trade unions would specifically target foreign companies 
avoiding collective agreements by exercising their free movement rights, but fail to 
target national companies avoiding collective agreements in other ways, this might also 
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constitute a restriction. In both cases, the Court would still have to consider potential 
justifications for collective industrial action by using the bidirectional proportionality 
test developed earlier.
98
 The Court would have to consider whether limiting options to 
take collective industrial action is necessary to protect the freedom to provide business 
across a border, keeping in mind that Article 16 of the Charter is less robust than Article 
12.  
The concept of the constitutionally conditioned internal market provides a new answer 
to the conundrum posed by the Laval and Viking conflict; an answer that is also in line 
with international guarantees of collective labour rights, and that avoids the challenges 
made before these committees.
99
  
The AGET Iraklion case: protecting the freedom to conduct a business versus 
workers’ participation in collective redundancies 
While the Court has not yet revisited its case law on the conflict between collective 
labour rights and economic freedoms, the AGET Iraklis
100
 case offered an opportunity 
for the Court to reconsider its contested case law on Article 16 CFREU, and thus pro-
vides another example of the potential use of constitutional conditioning.  
The case concerned collective redundancies in Greece, and more particularly the viabil-
ity of national legislation requiring a ministerial authorisation of any collective redun-
dancy in the absence of an agreement with the workers’ representatives. The case, 
allocated to the Grand Chamber, had a certain political salience, since it was referred by 
the Greek Council of State and related to legislation which has been part of the negotia-
tions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of August 2015 as well as a subject 
of debate by the Expert Group established in order to review labour law reforms which 
Greece undertook under a previous MoU.
101
  
Directive 98/59
102
 on collective redundancies neither requires nor precludes national 
legislation demanding consent of the works council or the ministry before a collective 
redundancy can become effective.
103
 While the widely discussed Alemo Herron case 
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concerned the degree to which the UK legislator had to consider Article 16 CFREU while 
implementing Article 3 of Directive 2001/23 on transfers of undertakings,
104
 the Greek 
legislation at stake in AGET Iraklis went over and above the requirements of Directive 
98/59. To the extent that it was not required, the Court found it did not implement 
Directive 98/59. Thus, in order to be able to use the CFREU as a standard, the Court 
needed to establish that the Greek legislation restricted an economic freedom, in this 
case Article 49 TFEU.105  
The Court followed AG Wahl in finding that the national legislation restricted freedom 
of establishment, that justification of the national measure would also have to satisfy 
the requirements of Article 16 CFREU, and that the specific restriction of Article 49 TFEU 
(read in the light of Article 16 CFREU) was not justifiable. 
In deciding whether there was indeed a restriction of freedom of establishment, the 
Court relied on its former case law that minimises the level of transnational activity a 
business needs to engage in to gain the protection of the EU economic freedoms.
106
 
Going beyond such reasoning, AG Wahl opened his opinion with the statement “The 
European Union is based on a free market economy, which implies that undertakings 
must have the freedom to conduct their business as they see fit”. The Court factually 
endorsed that reasoning without expressly referring to it: It stated that freedom of es-
tablishment not only constituted a positive right to establish in another Member State, 
but also a negative freedom to close down a subsidiary in that other Member State or 
reduce its activities.
 107 Also, the Court qualified taking on and dismissing employees as 
a decisive element of the freedom of establishment.108 Under this logic, any legislation 
limiting the employers’ freedom to dismiss employees would constitute a restriction of 
Article 49 TFEU, which would contrast with the Court’s case law up to then on economic 
freedoms, according to which employment protection  would only constitute a re-
striction of the free movement of workers if it specifically deterred an employee from 
moving to another country 109 As a result,  a Greek company struggling to comply with 
Greek employment protection law was protected by Article 49 TFEU on the basis that 
89% of its shares were held by a French multinational group of companies.
110
  
Both the Court and its AG also refer to Charter rights at the justification stage. While 
Article 16 of the Charter had already been used to extend the scope of freedom of es-
tablishment, it made another appearance at this stage, as Member States must protect 
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Charter guarantees of business freedom while limiting TFEU economic freedom. Article 
16 CFREU was read in a strictly libertarian way as the “freedom to exercise an economic 
or commercial activity, freedom of contract and free competition”,
111
 and thus ran par-
allel to an unconditioned freedom of establishment. Only social rights are referred to at 
the justification level.  
AG Wahl initially considered that, at the justification level, a balance needs to be struck 
between business freedom and other Charter rights.
112
 He found that Article 27 of the 
Charter (workers’ rights to consultation and information) must be given specific expres-
sion in EU and national law, which Directive 98/59 does not provide. Thus Article 27 
does not provide any protection here. Neither does Article 30, which guarantees the 
protection of workers in cases of unjustified dismissal, protect against economically 
motivated redundancies in Wahl’s view. Accordingly, he found no need to balance that 
provision with business freedom.  
The Court made ample reference to the EU’s social objectives,
 113 which feed into as-
pects of general interest which in principle may justify employment protection legisla-
tion (e.g. protection of works, or the maintenance of employment.
 114 The Court briefly 
mentioned Article 30 of the Charter in the context of proportionality.
115
 However, the 
Court only discussed whether the framework for collective redundancies is sufficiently 
transparent and predictable to avoid violation of Article 16 CFREU, and did not refer to 
Article 30 CFREU.
116
 As a result, a legislative prohibition on effecting collective redun-
dancies was viewed as disproportionate. In effect, Article 30 CFREU was thus not given 
substantive weight, and Article 27 CFREU was not mentioned. The reference to social 
policy objectives without linking them to their fundamental rights basis inevitably left 
the freedom of establishment, bolstered by Article 16 CFREU as a fundamental right, as 
the stronger, and victorious, principle. The “commendable”
117
 lengthy discussion of 
social policy objectives in effect legitimises that weakness with its juxtaposition of social 
policy and economic integration.  
Taking due consideration of the constitutionally conditioned Internal Market, the argu-
ment would need to proceed along different lines. Since the European Union is based 
on a social market economy (Article 3 TEU), and not merely on a free market economy, 
cross-border cooperation based on the economic freedoms is constitutionally condi-
tioned. Accordingly, the freedom of establishment as guaranteed by the Treaties would 
be conditioned by legislation (at EU or national level) protecting against dismissal and 
thus specifying Article 30 of the Charter, and ensuring that workers are consulted and 
informed (specifying Article 27 of the Charter). While the Court admits that Article 16 
‘recognises’ the freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and na-
tional law and practice, without guaranteeing it unconditionally, its refusal to substan-
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tively engage with Article 30 and 27 as fundamental rights results in the de-recognition 
of their guarantees as conditions for the Internal Market.  
Article 30 of the Charter in particular is not devoid of content: Following the Explana-
tions to the Charter, it must be interpreted with reference to Article 24 of the European 
Social Charter, according to which dismissals may be based on the operational require-
ments of the business, but mere economic difficulties can arguably not justify collective 
redundancy.
118
 Under Article 30 of the Charter, protection against dismissals is provided 
as guaranteed by Union law as well as national law and practice. Union law would com-
prise secondary legislation (which does not limit the freedom to dismiss employees), as 
well as Charter rights, including the right to engage in work (Article 15). National laws 
and practice include the Greek legislation which considers a collective dismissal unjusti-
fied in the absence of either agreement with the workers’ representatives or ministerial 
authorisation. That national law also sets the frame in which the right to business is 
guaranteed, alongside employees’ right to engage in work and their right to protection 
in the event of unjustified dismissal. This leads to a different interpretation of Article 49 
TFEU than that chosen by the Court. Since Article 49 TFEU is conditioned by the existing 
legislation in the field (as is, implicitly, Article 16 of the Charter), the mere application of 
employment protection legislation would not even constitute a restriction of this guar-
antee. The proportionality test would only be necessary if legislation either treated 
international employers differently from Greek employers, or factually had a more det-
rimental effect on international employers than on Greek employers.  
Overall, the concept of constitutionally conditioned economic integration allows a rea-
soned critique of overly libertarian case law and, if applied by the Court, would really 
make a difference in certain pivotal cases. 
V. Conclusion 
This article has developed the constitutionally conditioned Internal Market as a novel 
approach to EU constitutional law which offers the ECJ an alternative to prioritising EU 
economic freedoms over social rights in its future case law.  
The concept of a constitutionally conditioned Internal Market challenges the dogma 
that the EU’s economic and social constitutions necessarily stand in juxtaposition to 
each other. Drawing on the priority of human dignity and a modern human rights con-
cept as embodied in the Charter, this article concludes that the Internal Market is not 
“intervened in” by protecting social and labour rights, but that it is rather conditioned 
by adequate respect for, and protection and promotion of, these rights. This concept 
underlines the necessity for policy change, and at the same time develops innovative 
ways for warding off challenges posed by socio-economic standards established by leg-
islation or collective agreement.  
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As stressed above, the concept of a constitutionally conditioned internal market com-
prises the often rehearsed suggestion that in cases of conflict between economic free-
doms and social and labour rights, a bi-directional proportionality test has to be con-
ducted.
119
 The Court should not only ask whether the social right protected by legisla-
tion or collective bargaining disproportionately limits the economic freedom, but also 
consider whether depriving citizens of the specific social or labour right is necessary to 
safeguard the relevant economic freedom. Similarly, if the aim is merely to redraw the 
boundaries of the ECJ to control national law (i.e. to move the balance in favour of the 
Member States), the doctrinal proposal to “restrict the restriction”
120
 can achieve some 
progress in that the Court would exercise less control over national law.  
However, these proposals do not raise the question of whether the primacy of econom-
ic freedoms over social and labour rights is fundamentally wrong or not. By contrast, 
the constitutionally conditioned Internal Market establishes that rights, including those 
derived from the EU’s social constitution, shape rather than restrict EU economic free-
doms, effectively challenging the dominance of the latter. Using the example of social 
and labour rights, the article has demonstrated how these rights can be treated as a 
condition under which the Internal Market can function, and the economic freedoms 
implemented. This concept allows some scope for economic freedoms and competition 
law in so far as these instruments are suitable to overcome national and regional barri-
ers to economic integration. Constitutionally conditioned, economic freedoms are not 
just drawn back in favour of Member States or public legislators. Instead they are re-
drafted to accommodate, and incorporate the civilisation of raw market power by ac-
commodating social concerns. This way, the judicial application of Internal Market law 
can encourage and invigorate discourse on the best shape for the transnational market 
and society to which the EU aspires.  
Just developing these arguments is not, however, sufficient to exchange the “free mar-
ket economy” - conjured by AG Wahl as the EU’s economic constitution, - for the consti-
tutionally conditioned social market economy - as demanded by the Treaties and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights for the EU. As the Court must be viewed as a political 
actor, the preconditions for changes in its case law presuppose the development of a 
wider discourse on the adequate constitutional frame for the future of EU integration. 
Such discourse at the European level by a variety of actors would enable the rediscov-
ery of social integration as an endeavour underlying the EU project. The present geo-
political situation provides the leverage to develop and strengthen this discourse. While 
“Brexit” is based on internal UK politics, the fears of increasing EU economic integration 
suffered by those who feel left behind exist throughout the EU. Those same fears are 
used to justify a retreat towards protecting work for nationals, and to limit economic 
integration beyond the EU. The EU model of socio-economic integration offers, in prin-
ciple, an alternative to economic integration without any consideration for social con-
cerns. If the EU is to prevent its own disintegration and safeguard its geo-political posi-
tion, a retreat from its project of integration through rights does not seem a promising 
avenue. Instead, rebalancing the integration project in a truly European way would 
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require strengthening the social element through reinforcing social rights. It seems an 
appropriate time to engage in this discourse, for example through critical engagement 
with the European Pillar of Social Rights and its implementation. 
 
